

# From Jesuit ethics to Protestant natural law

*Johan Ihre and Hieremias Drexel's moral  
treatise on the vices of the tongue*<sup>1</sup>

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From ancient times onwards, moral thinkers have tried to establish principles and guidelines for the proper use of language and speech. In the middle ages and early modern times, the unrelenting attention paid to what can be, somewhat anachronistically, labelled the ethics of speech (“Sprachethik”) led to the creation of a real canon of both meritorious and, especially, condemnable verbal behaviour – or, to use an expression much *en vogue* at the time, a detailed catalogue of so-called virtuous and vicious tongues. Basically referring to morally acceptable and unacceptable ways of speaking (and, by extension, writing), the term “tongue” allowed for extensive rhetorical exploitation of the subject-matter. Thus, in moral treatises tongues were often personified: they were staged as autonomous living creatures, doing good or bad. However, behind such a personification nearly always lurked the literal meaning of the tongue as a part of the body – an organ not only responsible for ingestion but also for speaking, which, more than any other member (including the genitals), was eager to free itself from the strict control of reason and to act independently.<sup>2</sup>

One of the most popular and influential catalogues of tongues was drawn up in 1629 by the Jesuit Hieremias Drexel (1581–1638), who worked as a preacher at the court of Maximilian of Bavaria in Munich from 1615 until his death in 1638. During his service at court, he revealed himself as an extremely prolific author, writing nearly one book a year in the 1620s and 30s. Each book was based on sermons he had earlier preached before the Duke and Duchess of Bavaria. This is also the case with his *Orbis Phaëthon* (“The Phaëthon of the world”), a voluminous emblem book on the vices of the tongue, arranged in alphabetical order. First issued in 1629, the work was reprinted time and again in the course of the 17<sup>th</sup> century both in Germany and elsewhere, and rapidly became a “steady-seller” in both the Catholic and Protestant world.<sup>3</sup> In the present article, I shall focus on one particular, and, as I hope to show, particularly interesting, chapter from the history of reception of Drexel’s moralizing emblem book. Indeed, the work appears to lie at the basis of two academic dissertations written in 1742 and 1743, by – or at least under the super-

vision of – Johan Ihre (1707–1780), *professor Skytteanus* at the university of Uppsala. The dissertations were composed by Carolus Magnus Roos (1716–1771) from Västergötland in order to obtain a Master's degree in philosophy. The dissertations bear the same title and present themselves as two parts of one, encompassing work: *Dissertatio moralis de vitiis linguae eorumque remediis* (“Moral dissertation on the vices of the tongue and the remedies thereof”). The first part, *pro exercitio*, was defended on 18 March 1742, the second, *pro gradu*, on 25 June the following year.<sup>4</sup> As the disputation *pro gradu* took place after the conferment ceremony of 22 June 1743, Roos did not take part in it. In 1743, he was ordained and started a life as a priest in various parts of Västergötland, to be more precise in the diocese of Skara. For reasons we can only speculate about, he never received his Master's degree; in the available source material he is therefore referred to as “Kand.” (“kandidat”) and not as “Mag.”<sup>5</sup>

In the following pages, I shall submit these dissertations to a thorough intertextual analysis. More specifically, I shall try to show how Roos (or, perhaps, rather Ihre)<sup>6</sup> systematically but selectively excerpted Drexel's emblem book and adroitly turned his quintessentially Jesuit moral viewpoints into a solid, if slightly scholastic, exercise in Protestant natural law ethics, by adopting a philosophical framework and type of discourse that had been developed by Christian Wolff (1679–1754). Wolff was a German mathematician and philosopher who has been relegated to almost complete oblivion since the Kantian revolution in philosophy, but whose impact on the intellectual climate of 18<sup>th</sup>-century Protestant Europe can hardly be overestimated. In fact, his impact on Swedish academic life has been so strong that the historian of science Tore Frängsmyr does not hesitate to qualify him as a top fashion philosopher and has even coined the term “Wolffianism” in order to denote and describe his overwhelming influence.<sup>7</sup>

### Language and speech in a Wolffian perspective

As it happens, Johan Ihre played an important role in spreading the ideas and, equally important, the philosophical style of Christian Wolff. Central to the latter's concerns is the quest for certainty. Indeed, Wolff can be said to have propagated “certism”, that is to say, a kind of reason-based philosophy that only admits what is “certain” in order to keep theory as free as possible of “uncertainty”. Hence Wolff's so-called mathematical or, to use another suitable term, demonstrative approach which was painstakingly followed by Roos/Ihre in their dissertations on the vices of the tongue and which can be summarized as follows.<sup>8</sup> First of all, a philosopher is not allowed to use terms without giving an unambiguous explanation; second, he can only refer to a principle if he has first demon-

strated its validity. Next, he should cogently link all declarations and statements taken from these principles in such a way as to construct a logical-deductive system whose certainty mirrors, or at least approaches, that of mathematics.

Where does a philosopher find those absolutely certain principles on which to build his philosophical line of argumentation? They are to be derived from scientific study of the nature and properties of the object or objects under scrutiny. In so far as the ethical reflection on, for instance, the use and abuse of language and speech, is based on a penetrating study of the nature of language and speech, it acquires a truly scientific stature, and can be distinguished from an ethic derived from, and prescribed by authorities, whether lay or religious. As a result, moral philosophy is to be enriched with disciplines such as empirical psychology, natural law, natural history, and history – as is indeed the case in Wolff's own reflections on the ethics of speech and in Roos's/Ihre's more systematic treatment of the same subject-matter. Thus enriched with the auxiliary sciences required, moral philosophy takes precedence over (moral) theology as the principal source and foundation of practical or moral education.<sup>9</sup>

It is easy to understand why Wolff's viewpoints stirred quite a controversy. Indeed, they were strongly opposed and heavily attacked by conservative theologians eager to defend their privileged moral and academic position against what they considered to be dangerous intruders. This battle also took place at the university of Uppsala, and Johan Ihre was deeply involved in it, despite the fact that, as *professor Skytteanus*, he belonged to the Faculty of Arts and was supposed to occupy himself with the history and politics of the European states and constitutional law, as well as with Latin and Swedish language and literature, rather than with philosophy and theology as such.<sup>10</sup> However, Ihre did not refrain from dealing with philosophical issues and acting as a *praeses* for strictly philosophical dissertations, as is notably the case with those submitted by Carolus Magnus Roos in 1742 and 1743 on the vices of the tongue and their proper remedies. In the same period, Ihre vigorously supported Andreas Knös, a young student of philosophy who was so bold as to defend a thesis in which he propagated outspokenly Wolffian views on the relationship between natural and revealed religion by, among other things, drawing a clear distinction between reason and revelation. Ihre paid a heavy price for his support: joining hands with his political enemies, the theologians of Uppsala university succeeded in bringing him to court in 1747, where he was eventually condemned to paying a fine corresponding to no less than the annual salary of a professor.<sup>11</sup>

To be sure, Roos's/Ihre's dissertations on the vices of the tongue were less directly threatening to the theologians. As far as I can judge, they contain no viewpoints or prescriptions that are fundamentally at odds with established, religiously inspired morality. It is clear, however, that

these dissertations, too, have to be understood in the light of the ongoing debate about the primacy of theology, both as an academic discipline and an authoritative basis for correct conduct. Indeed, the dissertations offer fairly trite rules for proper verbal behaviour. Contrary to the precepts of traditional moral theology, however, they are founded on principles derived from scientific observation and mathematical reasoning; principles which, as a consequence, transcend the boundaries of established religion. This crucial aspect may partly help to explain why Roos's/Ihre's systematic account of the ethics of language and speech is so heavily indebted to the work of a 17<sup>th</sup>-century Jesuit preacher who, as such, had enjoyed a thorough training in Catholic moral theology. Admittedly, Ihre had serious objections against some tenets of Catholic, especially Jesuit, moral teaching and was not afraid of ventilating them in a rather polemical vein.<sup>12</sup> However, that did not keep him from excerpting Jesuit texts such as Drexel's *Orbis Phaëthon* for valuable insights to be incorporated in a natural law framework that, according to him, ought to be accepted by any rational human being, whether Catholic or Protestant.

### Cataloguing vicious speech

Hieremias Drexel's *Orbis Phaëthon* is not mentioned by Roos/Ihre until the very end of the fairly long list of vicious tongues which forms the core of the two dissertations. The reference functions as a kind of *praeteritio*: according to the authors, much more could have been said about the vices of the tongue than was feasible in an academic dissertation with its typical slenderness.<sup>13</sup> Readers who wish to learn more about the subject-matter are kindly asked to consult Drexel's *Orbis Phaëthon*, which is characterized as a most elegant work adorned with emblems, descriptions, and examples.<sup>14</sup> What Roos/Ihre omit to say in this succinct eulogy is that nearly all the tongues listed are borrowed from Drexel's alphabetical catalogue. Indeed, with the notable exception of one tongue only (see below), all the vices named can be traced back to the Jesuit's emblem book. Conversely, not all the vicious tongues analysed and depicted by Drexel have found a place in the academic dissertations by Roos/Ihre. Drexel's tediously long list of 43 vicious tongues has been reduced to a much shorter catalogue of 23 tongues. Sometimes, a tongue which received separate treatment in the *Orbis Phaëthon* is subsumed under another category. This is done either explicitly (for example, *lingua nugatoria et otiosa* [the nugatory and idle tongue] is subsumed under *lingua garrula* [the garrulous tongue], *lingua contentiosa* [the contentious tongue] under *lingua tumultuosa* [the tumultuous tongue], etcetera) or implicitly, as seems to be the case with detraction or backbiting (*lingua detrahens*). A separate vice in Drexel's emblem book, it is not to be found in Roos's/Ihre's dissertations, perhaps because it was closely connected to calumny (*lingua*

*calumniants*), which is duly discussed. This is confirmed in the last part of the second dissertation which is entirely devoted to an analysis of the remedies to be applied against verbal misbehaviour. In this part, *lingua vituperans* (vituperation), *convicians* (reproach, insult), *calumniants* (calumny), and *detrahens* (detraction) are explicitly associated with one another; what they have in common is that they all constitute a violation of another person's right (to a good name) and are consequently to be regarded, together with blasphemy and lying, as verbal injuries (*iniuriae*).<sup>15</sup>

It is interesting to note in this respect that detraction is conspicuously absent from Christian Wolff's discussion of verbal misbehaviour as well.<sup>16</sup> By contrast, it had always enjoyed a respectable standing in the Catholic moral tradition, where it was neatly distinguished from calumny.<sup>17</sup> Such impressive credentials can certainly not be attributed to the political tongue (*lingua politica*), which is discussed at length by Drexel but does not seem to have occupied any place in the established canon of vicious tongues before him. As can be inferred from his detailed description, the political tongue bears some resemblance to flattery, hypocrisy, and mendacity, although it has some peculiar features of its own. It is a tongue that adorns, or rather flaws, the mouth of people who think that the means are wholly justified by the goal and who make much of the common good, while at the same time pursuing their own interests. In short, it is the wicked tongue of Macchiavellian politicians and calculating courtiers.<sup>18</sup> We may surmise that Roos/Ihre preferred not to discuss the political tongue exactly because of its strong association with a particularly controversial political doctrine (Macchiavellianism) that deserved to be treated in another section of practical philosophy, namely politics.<sup>19</sup> In any case, by the time Roos was preparing his dissertations on the vices of the tongue, Ihre had already decided to treat Macchiavellianism in a separate dissertation.<sup>20</sup>

As I have said, Roos/Ihre discuss one tongue which is not treated as a separate vice in Drexel's *Orbis Phaëthon: assentatio*. The standard translation given in Latin dictionaries may give an indication as to why it is omitted by the Jesuit. Lewis and Short render it as "a flattering assent, flattery, adulation".<sup>21</sup> As such, it comes very close to, or even is identifiable with, *adulatio* (adulation, flattery), a pernicious tongue that does receive special attention in Drexel's emblem book. Several passages from *Orbis Phaëthon* show that, to the Jesuit author, *adulatio* and *assentatio* are mutually interchangeable.<sup>22</sup> While Roos/Ihre acknowledge the close relationship between the two vices, if only by discussing them one after the other, they nonetheless feel compelled to stress the differences between them. However, they do so in a rather sloppy manner, emphasizing the difference between *assentatio* and *blanditia/blandities* (caressing, flattery), rather than that between *assentatio* and *adulatio*. As a consequence, the reader is left wondering whether or not *blanditia/blandities* is to be equated with *adulatio*<sup>23</sup>:

Assent (*assentatio*) is a kind of flattery (*blanditia*). I just want to stress here that assent is not to be confused with flattery, as usually happens. Flattery has a much broader range than assent, as can easily be inferred from a comparison of their definitions. Indeed, if a person flatters (*blanditur*) another with words, he does not always exalt his words and deeds with his praise.<sup>24</sup>

A comparison between the definitions of *adulatio* and *assentatio* only seems to highlight the striking similarity between them:

The flattering tongue (*lingua adulans*) is the tongue which heaps upon others undeserved praise and honour which he knows very well they do not deserve.

He is said to assent (*assentari*) who approves of another man's words or deeds and exalts them with praise in order to please, little caring if they deserve that praise and if they should not rather be reprehended.<sup>25</sup>

If there is any difference between the two vices, then it is surely a very subtle one, as is duly recognized by Christian Wolff in his discussion of friendship and familiarity in his *Philosophia moralis sive ethica* ("Moral philosophy or ethics"). According to him, the vices are often confused with one another – a mistake made all the more easily as the German language does not have separate terms to distinguish them from one another.<sup>26</sup> Contrary to Roos/Ihre, Wolff goes to the trouble of clearly defining the term *blanditia*:

The signs of love given with the aim to please by means of facial expression, gesture, and words and deeds only deployed for the other's pleasure are called flatteries (*blanditiae*).<sup>27</sup>

This definition makes it clear in what respect both *assentatio* and *adulatio* can be regarded as specific vices of the tongue belonging to, or at least closely associated with, *blanditia*. To be more specific, they can be subsumed under the negative or bad type of *blanditia* which, contrary to its morally good counterpart, makes use of falsehood and simulation:

As love is either sincere or feigned, so flatteries (*blanditiae*) too are to be taken in a positive meaning if there is nothing feigned in them, or, conversely, in a negative meaning, if there is nothing true in them, but everything is feigned. Therefore, as an assenting person (*assentator*) speaks in order to please the other, not to tell the truth, and a flatterer (*adulator*) knowingly bestows undeserved praise and honour upon the other, assent and flattery can be accompanied by flatteries (*blanditiae*).<sup>28</sup>

What *adulatio* and *assentatio* have in common, then, is the use of flattering words aimed at pleasing another, with an eye to one's personal interest. The difference lies in the fact that, whereas a flatterer (*adulator*) knowingly and consciously bestows praise upon the flattered person which

he does not deserve and so falls prey to lying), an assenting person (*assentator*) does not necessarily tell lies, but chooses not to enquire whether the praise he bestows is true or not. From this it is easy to infer that an assenting person can easily slip into becoming a full-fledged flatterer – another reason why it is often so difficult to make a clear distinction between those two vices.<sup>29</sup>

### Redefining tongues

This small case-study makes it abundantly clear, I think, that Roos's/Ihre's intellectual work was not limited to making a proper selection from Drexel's impressively long list of evil tongues. At least one new tongue was introduced and given a definition that (more or less) complied with the Wolffian requirement of terminological precision. In fact, the new tongue originated from the acutely sensed need of being more accurate than the Jesuit preacher Drexel was – or, for that matter, needed to be – in his *Orbis Phaëthon*. On a more general level, it can be said that the task of transforming Drexel's collection of moralizing sermons into a typically Wolffian philosophical dissertation compelled the authors to revise many of the definitions and descriptions they found in his inexhaustible treasure-house. How far this process of translation could go is eloquently demonstrated by Roos's/Ihre's discussion of lying.

Lying and deceit are treated at length in Drexel's *Orbis Phaëthon*. The Jesuit author "created" a number of tongues in order to show the manifold appearances of these vices and demonstrate their detrimental effects: apart from the fraudulent (*fraudulenta*), fallacious (*fallax*), and feigning or counterfeiting tongues (*fucata lingua*), the author also pays attention to the exaggerating (*hyperbolica*) and hypocritical (*hypocritica*) tongues, the exaggerating tongue bearing some resemblance to the boasting or ostentatious tongue (*iactantia*).<sup>30</sup> Although the fraudulent, fallacious, and feigning tongues are called three separate daughters of lying (*mendacium*), they are also represented as three different aspects of yet another vice, the cunning or deceitful tongue (*lingua dolosa*).<sup>31</sup> Drexel had enjoyed a thorough theological training and was well acquainted with the works of medieval and early modern Catholic scholastic theologians. However, he did not profess scholastic theology; nor had he any philosophical ambitions, for that matter. Consequently, it comes as no surprise to see that his definition of deceitful tongues lacks the precision that was expected in theological (and philosophical) works of a more technical kind. For one thing, Drexel deliberately blurs the distinction between verbal and non-verbal strategies of deception, subsuming fraud under the broader category of (illicit) *verbal* behaviour, whereas late scholastic theologians unanimously followed the lead of St Thomas Aquinas who had defined it as a form of cunning behaviour (*astutia*) performed through *deeds*.<sup>32</sup>

Apart from blurring the distinction between verbal and non-verbal strategies of deception, Drexel also applied a rather vague and broad concept of lying (*mendacium*), thereby failing to make a neat distinction between a liar (*mendax*) and a deceiver (*fallax*). Lying, as Catholic moral theologians understood it, was a false statement intended to deceive. Lies could be expressed through words or any other act to which convention had assigned meaning, such as gestures. Non-verbal lying was labelled simulation (*simulatio*). According to the theologians, saying a false thing was not synonymous with telling a lie: a liar was a person who said something he did not believe to be true. However, not every lie should be considered a false statement intended to deceive. In order to prove this, the theologians refer to a person who tells a lie to avoid being convicted on account of his own confession, although he realizes that his opponent will not believe him.<sup>33</sup>

However that may be, Drexel wholeheartedly endorsed the severe Augustinian position, upheld by Catholic moral theologians, that lying could never be approved of. In his two treatises *De mendacio* (“On lying”) and *Contra mendacium* (“Against lying”), St Augustine had argued that all acts of lying were always wrong, even in cases when telling a lie would prevent disaster – an extreme standpoint which was later ridiculed by Desiderius Erasmus in his *Moriae encomium sive laus stultitiae* (“Praise of Folly”).<sup>34</sup> The theologians condemned lying as being detrimental to social life and to the instruments of communication on which social life is based. Indeed, a liar abuses the signs which we have at our disposal to express our inner thoughts and emotions and, by doing so, to enter into meaningful communication with others. He corrupts the natural function of language which consists of a number of signs which enable us to signify or indicate something. According to the theologians, these signs have not been given to us for our own sake but rather for the sake of our fellow men.<sup>35</sup> While truthfulness entails simplicity or open-heartedness (*simplicitas*), lying creates discord and duplicity (*duplicitas*). Indeed, a liar bears one thing in his or her heart but shows something completely different. In short, he or she creates a gap between signifier and signified and perverts the natural function of speech and body language. By doing so, he or she destroys mutual trust and sympathy which are deemed essential to any society.<sup>36</sup>

This traditional Catholic view on the morality – or rather immorality – of lying and deception already contains the germs of a radical change in conceptualizing truth-telling and lying as it occurred in the Protestant natural law tradition. Hugo Grotius was the first to unambiguously state that a person’s moral obligation to tell the truth directly depends on another person’s right to know the truth. According to Grotius, anyone who speaks enters into a tacit agreement to respect the listener’s power or freedom to judge, his or her *libertas iudicandi*.<sup>37</sup> This viewpoint has

far-reaching consequences for the traditionally upheld prohibition of lying. Indeed, this prohibition turns out to be far less general and absolute than was maintained, at least in principle, by Catholic moral theologians. In some cases, Grotius says, it is perfectly allowed not to tell the truth and have recourse to a false statement (*falsum*); the false statement is not to be deemed a lie if the listener's right to receive the truth has not been violated or if he does not have such a right in the first place, as would be the case with, for example, children and weak-minded persons.<sup>38</sup>

The strong emphasis on the listener's right lies at the heart of the ensuing Protestant natural law discourse on truth-telling and lying, as becomes apparent in Samuel Pufendorf's *De officio hominis et civis* ("On the duty of man and citizen") (1686) and Christian Wolff's *Ius naturae* (1740–1748) as well as his *Philosophia moralis sive ethica* (1753). The latter's views are succinctly presented by Roos/Ihre in their dissertations on the vices of the tongue. To begin with, their definition of the lying tongue (*lingua mentiens*) is fairly similar to Wolff's definition of *mendacium* in *Ius naturae* and of *mendacitas* in *Philosophia moralis*:

Roos/Ihre, *Dissertatio*, II, par. 61, p. 17: The lying tongue is the tongue which deliberately expresses words that do not make clear that which needs to be indicated to the other, who nonetheless has a right to know it.<sup>39</sup>

Wolff, *Ius naturae*, pars III, cap. II, par. 183, pp. 122–123: A lie is an illicit false statement which conflicts with a certain duty towards others or an obligation made, under which we are bound to another person in particular, or [to put it otherwise], which is against another one's perfect or imperfect right. Now, such a false statement which conflicts with the obligation under which we are bound to reveal our thoughts to another one, and consequently with a certain duty towards others or a certain obligation made, under which we are bound to him in particular, and which therefore is against the other's right – either perfect or imperfect – is a lie.<sup>40</sup>

Wolff, *Philosophia moralis*, pars V, cap. VII, par. 538, p. 725: *Mendacitas* is a vice by which a person who is obligated to morally tell the truth, morally says something false. By contrast, veracity is the virtue by which a person morally tells the truth, when he is bound to indicate his thoughts to another.<sup>41</sup>

As can easily be gathered from these definitions, the vice of lying depends on the right of the listener to know the truth. The logical inference from this principle is that a falsehood told to a person who does not have a right to know the truth cannot be labelled a lie. Interestingly, Roos/Ihre do not enter into a detailed discussion of cases in which particular persons are not entitled to knowing the truth. In this respect at least, they differ from Wolff who, in his *Ius naturae*, had given the same example as Grotius

– and, following his lead, Pufendorf – had earlier adduced to prove their point, namely that one is not obliged to tell the truth to children and weak-minded persons as they do not have the right to know the truth.<sup>42</sup> However, Roos/Ihre do support Wolff in his adamant critique of the traditional Catholic doctrine of lying, which made a clear distinction between various kinds of lies with varying degrees of sinfulness, the worst type being the kind of lie that causes harm to another (*mendacium perniciosum* [the pernicious lie] which is to be regarded as a capital sin, as opposed to *mendacium officiosum* [the officious lie] and *mendacium iocosum* [the white lie] which can be condoned as venial sins). Whereas Wolff goes to the trouble of systematically undermining the Catholic position,<sup>43</sup> Roos/Ihre without further ado dismiss it as untenable:

All this goes to prove that the lying tongue should not be assessed on grounds of the damage inflicted on the other but on grounds of the suppression of the truth which the right which the other possesses demands he should know. As a result, it should also be considered a lie if someone without causing any damage to the other conceals the truth which the other has the right to know. However, it will not be a lie if someone with false speech inflicts damage on another who does not enjoy the right to understand the truth.<sup>44</sup>

Another difference with Wolff is that Roos/Ihre seem to suggest that it is allowed to tell a falsehood to a person who does not have a right to know the truth. In any case, this inference or interpretation is not explicitly rejected by them. This runs counter to Wolff's exposition in both *Ius naturae* and *Philosophia moralis*. In both works, the author takes great pains to stress that in ordinary, daily conversation, lies are *always* forbidden. If one talks to a person who is not entitled to knowing the truth, the right course of action is not to tell a falsehood but rather to keep silent – an attitude subsumed under the virtue of taciturnity (*taciturnitas*).<sup>45</sup> As can be inferred from the passage quoted above, Roos/Ihre did not agree with Wolff on this particular point, in so far as they also consider the concealment of truth as a kind of lie which violates another person's right to know the truth. Interestingly enough, Wolff's position comes very close to the *communis opinio* upheld by Catholic moral theologians.<sup>46</sup> Unsurprisingly, this was carefully concealed by Wolff who, not unlike Roos/Ihre in their own dissertations, was eager to emphasize the contrast between his scientifically based ethics of speech and Catholic, especially Jesuit, moral theology which they all deemed most repellent in its moral acceptance, or even downright approval, of the use of mental reservations or mental restrictions.<sup>47</sup>

### Combining modes of discourse

In sum, Roos's/Ihre's discussion of lying is in line with Wolff's viewpoints, but does not entirely coincide with them. The differences we have noticed in their ways of defining the sin and determining its exact scope can only partly be explained by the specific design of an early modern academic dissertation, which, as I have indicated, obliged Roos/Ihre to be very succinct and, consequently, to forgo digressions which might have added more detail and nuances. In my opinion, the discrepancies also have to do with the fact that, at the time Roos/Ihre were writing their second dissertation, featuring the lying tongue, the third part of Wolff's *Ius naturae*, in which that vice is discussed at length, was not yet available to them. From the preface to this part, it can be inferred that Wolff did not complete his manuscript until 6 April 1743. We can safely assume from this that the volume had not yet been printed, or at the very least that no printed copy had yet reached Uppsala when Roos/Ihre were composing the dissertation that was scheduled to be defended on 25 June 1743. By contrast, they could study the first part of Wolff's monumental treatise on natural law, which dealt with a number of other vices of the tongue. A detailed comparison makes it abundantly clear that Roos/Ihre had access to the volume, and made ample use of it, as early as the beginning of 1742, when they were compiling their first academic dissertation.<sup>48</sup> As the following example taken from their discussion of assent (*assentatio*) clearly shows, the authors slavishly followed the German philosopher, even going so far as to literally copy his text with only minor stylistic adaptations:

Roos/Ihre, *Dissertatio* I, par. 24, pp. 17–18: He is said to assent who approves of another man's words or deeds and exalts them with praise in order to please, little caring if they deserve that praise and if they should not rather be reprehended. Hence we understand what assent is. Now, someone who flatters another deploys his external actions entirely with the single goal of pleasing the other, not taking into account the morality thereof (by definition); therefore assent is a kind of flattery. I just want to stress here that assent is not to be confused with flattery, as usually happens. Flattery has a much broader range than assent, as can easily be inferred from a comparison of their definitions. Indeed, if a person flatters another with words, he does not always exalt his words and deeds with his praise.<sup>49</sup>

Wolff, *Ius naturae*, pars I, par. 963, p. 628: He is said to assent who exalts another man's words or deeds with praise in order to please, little caring if they deserve that praise and if they should not rather be reprehended. This goes to show what kind of vice assent is. As a person who flatters another one, deploys his external actions entirely with the single goal of pleasing the other (par. 961), assent is a kind of flattery. Usually, assent and flattery are confused with one another. However, the latter has a much broader range than the former (par. 961

and preface). Indeed, if we flatter another with words, we do not always exalt his words and deeds with our praise.<sup>50</sup>

As we have seen, Roos's/Ihre's exposition is unsatisfactory in the sense that they omit to clarify the conceptual difference between *adulatio* and *assentatio*, focusing instead on the relationship between *blanditia/blandities* and *assentatio*. There is reason to believe that this omission is due to careless reading or injudicious compiling. For after having highlighted the difference between *blanditia/blandities* and *assentatio* in the passage quoted above, Wolff duly continues explaining the distinction to be made between assent and adulation:

Assent (*assentatio*) is also often confused with flattery (*adulatio*), in so far as the flatterer (*adulator*) also bestows undeserved praise upon another (par. 892), to the extent that praise also includes the act of honouring. Now, an assenting person (*assentator*), in so far as he flatters (*blanditur*) another, principally intends not to offend the other, whereas a flatterer (*adulator*), by contrast, is striving for the other's sympathy and favour for his own benefit.<sup>51</sup>

My brief analysis of how Roos/Ihre adapted Drexel's *Orbis Phaëthon* so as to cast it in a recognizably "Wolffian" mould may have given the impression that the authors stripped the Jesuit's work of virtually all its characteristic features, only to keep an (admittedly much shorter) list of vicious tongues which were systematically to be redefined in terms directly derived from Wolff's natural law system. This impression is not altogether correct. Rather than merely transforming Drexel's moralizing emblem book into a dry, philosophical tract, Roos/Ihre sought to combine the technical language and strictly deductive line of reasoning typical of Wolff's natural law philosophy with a less "mathematical", more humanist mode of discourse, in which logical proof made place for a rich variety of rhetorical strategies aimed at persuading the reader. Unsurprisingly, this alternative mode of discourse was found in the work of Hieremias Drexel, whose intentions as an emblem author were, indeed, first and foremost exhortatory or paraenetic. To be sure, the Jesuit's analysis of a vicious tongue often takes the form of a strict line of reasoning designed to eradicate false opinions and replace them with true insights. Apart from that, however, the author also proves to be very fond of personifications, historical *exempla*, and similes. One of his favourite strategies consists of personifying the tongues which he describes. They are presented as living creatures: the author, as it were, enters into a debate with them and tries to corner them by asking them annoying but pertinent questions. Furthermore, Drexel heaps one historical anecdote after the other upon the reader. Apart from highlighting in a pleasant way some particular features of a tongue, the anecdotes are also meant to stimulate imitation and emulation

of good, that is to say exemplary, (verbal) behaviour. Last but not least, the author appeals to his readers' powers of imagination by making use of comparisons and images which in a vivid manner illustrate various relevant aspects of sinful speech.<sup>52</sup>

Personifications, historical *exempla*, and vivid similes: all these features reappear to a certain extent in the many digressions that adorn Roos's/Ihre's dissertations, where they are clearly separated from the main text by their distinctly smaller typeface. Unsurprisingly, these digressions have been compiled in much the same way as the main text. Not infrequently, Roos/Ihre have copied whole passages from Drexel's work, although they were often forced to trim the Jesuit's rather verbose prose by leaving out some anecdotes or rephrasing his line of thought in a more economical way. One example may suffice to illustrate their method of adaptation. It is taken from the discussion of the double, or rather forked, tongue (*lingua bifida*); the passages left out by Roos/Ihre are printed in smaller typeface; what they have added on their own is rendered in italics.

Drexel, *Orbis Phaëthon*: (...) Diodorus of Sicily narrates that on a southern island a people is living with tongues by nature split from the root onwards, which they move so rapidly that, besides human speech, they can imitate the songs of all types of birds. Among this people, one person can easily answer two persons [Diodor. l. 3, near the end].<sup>53</sup> A beautiful but invented story, I think, which, however, fits our case. For this skill is typical of the double-tongued man: he caws with crows, chirps with thistle-finches, sings with nightingales, and coos with doves. The double-tongued man answers two, or even more persons at one and the same time. He says black to some, white to others; with some he talks about onions, with others about garlic. In a double-tongued man heart and tongue do not accord at all; he speaks like the wicked old men who sought to seduce Susanna: one said she approached him under the mastic-tree, the other under the holm-oak.<sup>54</sup> This one and the same man can do if he is double-tongued. For, as the old adage goes: '[He says] one thing standing and another sitting.'<sup>55</sup> He has honey in his mouth, but sharp knives under his belt. With one hand he carries a stone, with the other he proffers bread.<sup>56</sup> He offers to serve while contemplating ruin. (...) <sup>57</sup>

Roos/Ihre, *Dissertatio*: (...) In the third book, around the end, Diodorus of Sicily narrates that on a southern island a people is living with tongues by nature split from the root onwards, which they move so rapidly that, besides human speech, they can imitate the songs of all types of birds. Among this people there is even a person who can easily answer two persons simultaneously. A beautiful story, I think, as it depicts the skill typical of the double-tongued man: he caws with crows, chirps with thistle-finches, sings with nightingales, and coos with doves. The double-tongued man answers two, or even more persons at one and the same time. He says black to some, white to others; with some he talks about onions, with others about garlic. For, as the old adage has it: '[He says] one thing standing and another sitting, and

from the same mouth he blows cold and hot at the same time.' *From the same well more often than not also springs up the maliciously advising tongue, which pollutes not only cottages and country-houses, but also courts, palaces, and the towers of kings. For, alas, such presents are bestowed on men who for their own benefit often give bad advice.*<sup>58</sup>

The last passage is absent from Drexel's discussion of the double tongue. However, the connection between the double tongue and bad advice can hardly be called original, as it can easily be traced to the chapter which Drexel devoted to *lingua male consulentis* in his *Orbis Phaëthon*. There we find the very same words that are used by Roos/Ihre:

Among the wicked tongues the tongue of bad advice has the greatest influence. For it pollutes not only cottages and country-houses, but also courts, palaces, and the towers of kings. This tongue is the mother of the greatest evils unless it is controlled not only skilfully but also scrupulously and with deep faith.<sup>59</sup>

This goes to prove that Roos/Ihre created a veritable patchwork, a *cento* composed of various passages sometimes taken from quite different chapters of Drexel's monumental treatise on the vices of the tongue, a work deeply rooted in the time-honoured commonplace tradition.<sup>60</sup> As a commonplace book, it lent itself easily to exploitation by Catholic preachers and catechizers in need of material to compose their sermons and lessons<sup>61</sup> – as well as by Protestant scholars looking for material to write their academic dissertations.

## Conclusion

In 1742 and 1743, Carolus Magnus Roos, a Swedish student of philosophy at the university of Uppsala, wrote two dissertations on the vices of the tongue and the remedies to be applied against them. He was supported by the famous and influential *professor Skytteanus* Johan Ihre, who acted as *praeses* during his disputations. Loyal adherents to the Swedish state church, Roos/Ihre nonetheless saw no qualms in drawing on a Catholic moralizing treatise, namely the voluminous emblem book *Orbis Phaëthon*, which the popular German Jesuit Hieremias Drexel had devoted to the same subject-matter more than a century earlier. His work is duly praised and lavishly excerpted by Roos/Ihre, but only rarely mentioned. Despite this remarkable fact, Roos/Ihre fulfilled one of Drexel's wishes: in the preface to the reader, the Jesuit preacher had stressed that, while he fiercely defended his own faith, he did not want to enter into a battle with his religious adversaries, but rather was hoping that they, too, would read and take to heart his moral lessons. For as far as he was concerned, most Protestants erred innocently.<sup>62</sup>

The dissertations submitted by Roos but probably co-authored by Ihre aimed to offer a systematic moral philosophy of speech designed from a distinctly Wolffian natural law perspective. This perspective, however, characterized by strong emphasis on precise definitions and strictly deductive reasoning, is combined with a more rhetorical style destined to exhort readers to improve their verbal behaviour or, to use the authors' phraseology, to eradicate the detrimental vices of the tongue. That the authors fused those two strikingly different modes of discourse, can to a large extent be attributed to the well-established practice of the genre which they exploited: academic dissertations were indeed intended to confirm useful truths by having recourse to a wide variety of authorities, each of them deploying a specific mode of discourse.<sup>63</sup> At the same time, however, Roos/Ihre seem to have been eager to present themselves as eclectic thinkers – as scientists determined to discover the true nature of things with the powers of their own intellect, while at the same time carefully examining all available authorities and judiciously quoting from them.<sup>64</sup> However that may be, the approach adopted in the dissertations on the ethics of language and speech perfectly mirrors Johan Ihre's comprehensive mind, capable of reconciling diverse, even seemingly contradictory, interests and viewpoints.<sup>65</sup>

### Summary

*From Jesuit ethics to Protestant natural law. Johan Ihre and Hieremias Drexel's moral treatise on the vices of the tongue. By Toon Van Houdt.* In 1742 and 1743 Carolus Magnus Roos (1716–1771), a student from Västergötland, defended a dissertation about condemnable verbal behaviour entitled *Dissertatio moralis de vitiis linguae eorumque remediis* ("Moral dissertation on the vices of the tongue and the remedies thereof"). In all likelihood, the work was at least co-authored by the famous *professor Skytteanus* (1707–1780) Johan Ihre, who acted as Roos's supervisor. A thorough intertextual analysis reveals that the authors heavily drew on *Orbis Phaëthon*, a voluminous emblem book about the same subject-matter published in 1629 by the Bavarian Jesuit Hieremias Drexel (1581–1638). Roos/Ihre turned his quintessentially Jesuit moral viewpoint into a solid exercise in Protestant natural law ethics by adopting a philosophical framework that had previously been developed by the German philosopher Christian Wolff (1679–1754). Interestingly enough, however, Wolff's deductive, almost mathematical type of discourse was supplemented by Roos/Ihre with a more humanist or rhetorical mode of discourse directly borrowed from Drexel's emblem book itself.

## Notes

1. Enlarged and revised version of a paper read at the 14<sup>th</sup> International Congress of the International Association for Neo-Latin Studies, 2–8 August 2009 in Uppsala, Sweden. I should like to thank James Latham (†), Krister Östlund, and the two anonymous referees of *Lychmos* for their perspicuous comments on an earlier version of this paper. I am also grateful to Ingrid Sperber for having corrected my English.

2. On the “somatization” of good and bad speech (and writing), see Toon Van Houdt: “Introduction” in Antonius a Burgundia: *Linguae vitia et remedia* (Antwerp, 1631), Imago Figurata. Editions, 1 (Turnhout, 1999), 9–39 (16–17). See also Carla Mazzio: “Sins of the Tongue” in David Hillman & Carla Mazzio (eds.): *The body in parts. Fantasies of corporeality in early modern Europe* (New York & London, 1997), 53–79 (69–70).

3. For a more detailed biographical account, see Karl Pörnbacher: *Jeremias Drexel. Leben und Werk eines Barockpredigers* (Munich, 1965) and Heribert Breidenbach: *Der Emblematiker Jeremias Drexel S.J. (1581–1638). Mit einer Einführung in die Jesuitenemblematik und einer Bibliographie der Jesuitenemblembücher* (Ph.D. diss., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1970), 180–192. For a recent analysis and interpretation of *Orbis Phaëthon*, see especially James Latham: “Text and image in Jeremias Drexel’s *Orbis Phaëthon*” in Peter M. Daly, G. Richard Dimler & Rita Haub (eds.): *Emblematik und Kunst der Jesuiten in Bayern. Einfluss und Wirkung*, Imago Figurata. Studies, 3 (Turnhout, 2000), 85–105 and Toon Van Houdt: “Hieremias Drexel’s emblem book *Orbis Phaëthon* (1629). Moral message and strategies of persuasion” in Karl A. E. Enenkel & Arnoud S. Q. Visser (eds.): *Mundus Emblematicus. Studies in Neo-Latin emblem books*, Imago Figurata. Studies, 4 (Turnhout, 2003), 325–350.

4. Dis. Ac. Ups. Ihre 41 and 42 in Johan Henric Lidén: *Catalogus disputationum in academiis et gymnasiis Sveciae*, sectio I–V (Upsaliae, 1777–1778).

5. Cf. Uppsala university library, Ms U901a (immatriculation list of the “Västgöta” student nation); *Skara Stifts Herdaminne, utgivet af Joh. W. Warholm* 2 (Mariestad, 1872), 312. I owe these biographical data to Dr

Krister Östlund, librarian at Carolina Rediviva university library, Uppsala, and to one of the anonymous referees.

6. The question whether the *praeses* or the respondent himself wrote the dissertations is a particularly vexed one and cannot be given an unequivocal answer. In the present article, I assume that Roos and Ihre share authorial responsibility for the dissertations I shall discuss. For an excellent *status quaestionis* on the matter, see Krister Östlund: “Introduction” in idem (ed.): *Johan Ihre on the Origins and History of the Runes. Three Latin Dissertations from the Mid-18<sup>th</sup> Century*, Edited with Translation and Commentary, Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis. Studia Latina Upsaliensia, 25 (Uppsala, 2000), 11–81, especially 16–17.

7. Tore Frängsmyr: *Svensk idéhistoria. Bildning och vetenskap under tusen år. Del 1, 1000–1809* (Stockholm, 2000), 288 (“modefilosofen Christian Wolff”). See also his standard work *Wolffianismens genombrott i Uppsala: frihetstida universitetsfilosofi till 1700-talets mitt*, Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis. Skrifter rörande Uppsala universitet C. 6 (Uppsala, 1972).

8. Borrowed from Heinz Mohnhaupt: “‘Lex certa’ and ‘ius certum’.” The search for legal certainty and security” in Lorraine Daston & Michael Stolleis (eds.): *Natural law and laws of nature in early modern Europe. Jurisprudence, theology and natural philosophy* (Farnham & Burlington, VT, 2008), 73–88 (especially 83).

9. T. J. Hochstrasser: *Natural law theories in the early Enlightenment*, Ideas in Context (Cambridge, 2000), 13–14. For a general account of Wolff’s philosophical system, see Winfried Lenders: “Nachwort” in Christian Wolff: *Gesammelte Werke*, herausgegeben und bearbeitet von J. Ecole, J. E. Hofmann, M. Thomann und H. W. Arendt, II. Abteilung. Lateinische Schriften, 16 (Hildesheim & New York, 1973), i–xxii.

10. Östlund: “Introduction”, 19–20.

11. Frängsmyr: *Svensk idéhistoria*, especially 294. For the political background, see also Östlund: “Introduction”, 22.

12. As is clearly revealed in the thesis defended under his guidance by Petrus Helstenius in 1755 which is entitled *Dissertatio praecipuos errores Jesuitarum in disciplina*

*moralis examinans* (“Dissertation examining the main errors of the Jesuits in ethics”) (Lidén, no 331).

13. *Dissertatio* II, par. 62, p. 17: “Multa quidem de hoc vitio Linguae (sc. linguae mentienti) dici possent; sed prolixioribus nobis esse non licet.” Cf. *Dissertatio* I, par. 26, p. 19: “... memento B.L. multitudinem vitiorum, quibus lingua proh dolor! exposita est, tantam esse, ut singula, ea copia, qua alias opus esset, in hisce pagellis minime exponi possint, quapropter interdum fieri videbis, ut non nisi brevem eorum descriptionem simul allaturi.”

14. *Dissertatio* II, par. 62, p. 17: “... ad elegantissimum Drexelii librum, qui inscribitur Orbis Phaeeton...”, and p. 18: “has (sc. linguas) si quis alius, certe jam laudatus auctor, emblematicis, descriptionibus et exemplis, ita in libro suo tractavit, ut optandum esset, in omnium praecipue eorum, qui foedis vitiorum linguae morbis laborant, manibus ut versaretur.”

15. *Dissertatio* II, par. LXIV, p. 19: “Lingua vituperans, convicians, calumnians, detrahens blasphemans, mentiens ea agit quae sunt contra jus alterius”; par. LXV, p. 19: “Lingua vituperans, convicians etc. recte inter injurias numerantur.” For the definition and classification of verbal injury in early modern civil and canon law, see Ian Maclean: “Smaad en de betekenis theorie in Europa van 1500 tot 1630” in *Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Rechtsfilosofie en Rechtstheorie*, 24.2 (1995), 113–131.

16. The ethics of speech is treated in the first and third part of Wolff’s *Ius naturae*, published in 1740 and 1743, as well as in the fifth part of his *Philosophia moralis sive ethica*, published in 1753.

17. See Carla Casagrande & Silvana Vecchio: *Les péchés de la langue. Discipline et éthique de la parole dans la culture médiévale* (Paris, 1991), 231–238 (*contumelia, convicium*, more or less identical to *calumniā*) and 239–252 (*detractio*). In fact, the distinction can be traced back to Roman law (D. 47.10.46).

18. *Orbis Phaëthon*, II, 15, 272–293 (*De politica lingua*).

19. As is pointed out by Lenders in his “Nachwort” to Wolff’s *Gesammelte Werke* (ix), the German philosopher took over the Aristotelian division of practical philosophy into ethics, economics, and politics.

20. It was defended in 1743 by Petrus Wil-

helmus Wargentin under the title *De politica Machiavelli* (Lidén, no 84).

21. Ch. T. Lewis & Ch. Short: *A Latin dictionary* (Oxford, 1984), 177.

22. See e.g. *Orbis Phaëthon*, cap. 1 (*adulatio*), par. 1, p. 6: “Crates Thebanus eos quorum munificentia in solos *assentatores* iret ...”; par. 9, p. 9: “Tales habuit Dionysius res *assentatores* qui ...”.

23. In classical usage, *blanditia* usually had a positive connotation. Cf. Ch.T. Lewis & Ch. Short, *A Latin dictionary* (Oxford, 1984), p. 241, s.v. *blanditia*.

24. “Assentatio blanditiae cujusdam species est. Hic tantum moneo, assentationem cum *blanditia*, quod vulgo fieri solet, non esse confundendam; latius multo haec illa patet, ut ex collatione definitionum facile colligitur: nam si quis verbis blanditur alteri, non semper dicta et facta ejus laudibus extollit” (II, par. 24, 18).

25. “*Lingua adulans est, quae alios immeritis laudibus ac honoribus, quos eos non mereri probe novit, cumulat*” (I, p. 16, par. 22). “Assentari dicitur, qui quae loquitur vel facit alter, comprobatur laudibusque extollit, ut placeat, parum sollicitus num laudem istam mereantur, et an non potius reprehendenda sunt” (par. 24, 17).

26. Wolff: *Philosophia moralis sive ethica*, pars V, cap. III, par. 205, p. 285, J. Ecole, J. E. Hofmann, M. Thomann, H. W. Arndt (eds.) in Christian Wolff: *Gesammelte Werke* II. Abteilung (Lateinische Schriften), Band 16 (Hildesheim & New York, 1973): “Neque idiomate patrio duo haec vitia distinguuntur, uno enim eodemque nomine ‘Schmeicheln’ indignantur.” The philosopher’s need for a clear and absolutely precise terminology and the lack of it in common parlance is a recurring theme in Wolff’s work. As can be inferred from the passages translated above, the same problem occurs in English.

27. Wolff: *Philosophia moralis sive ethica*, pars V, cap. III, par. 206, p. 285: “*Blanditiae* vocantur signa amoris, quae animo placendi vultu, gestu et verbis atque actionibus ad voluptatem alterius unice compositis eduntur.”

28. *Ibidem*: “Cum amor vel sit sincerus, vel simulatus, *blanditiae* quoque nunc sumuntur in bono significato, si nihil in iis est simulatum, nunc in malo, si in iis nihil verum, sed omne simulatum. Quamobrem cum assentator saltem loquatur ad voluptatem alterius, non ad veritatem, et adulator sciens immeritis

laudibus ac honoribus alterum cumulet, ad assentationem et adulationem etiam accedere possunt blanditiae.”

29. Wolff: *Philosophia moralis sive ethica*, pars V, cap. III, par. 205, p. 285: “Quoniam differunt, immeritis aliquem contra conscientiam ornare laudibus ac honoribus et alterius dicta et facta approbare, quamvis utrumque fiat ad captandam benevolentiam commodi proprii causa, placuit prius adulationem, posterius assentationem vocare. Sit ita quod assentatio haud raro accedat ad adulationem, ut ideo tanto facilius contingat, ne differentia animadvertatur.” As we shall see, Wolff makes a slightly different distinction between the two vices in his *Ius naturae*.

30. Still more vices of the tongue can be mentioned here, which also contain an element of deceit, such as flattery (*adulatio*), calumny (*calumnia*) and the political tongue (*lingua politica*).

31. *Orbis Phaëthon*, cap. I, par. 22, p. 458.

32. Thomas Aquinas: *Summa theologiae*, II,II, 55, 4 ad 2 and 5.

33. See for example Leonardus Lessius: *De iustitia et iure, ceterisque virtutibus cardinalibus* (Antverpiae, 1632), II.47.6.33. The distinction between *mendax* and *fallax* goes back to St Augustine, *Solil.* II.9: “Omnis fallax adpetit fallere; non autem omnis vult fallere, qui mentitur.” See further J. P. Sommerville: “The ‘new art of lying’. Equivocation, mental reservation, and casuistry” in E. Leites (ed.): *Conscience and casuistry in early modern Europe*, Ideas in context (Cambridge & Paris, 1988), 160–162.

34. Erasmus: *Moriae encomium*, ASD IV, 3, p. 148, ll. 414–416. Erasmus’ views on lying are analysed in detail in Johannes Trapman: “Erasmus on Lying and Simulation” in Toon Van Houdt et al. (eds.): *On the edge of truth and honesty. Principles and strategies of fraud and deceit in the early modern period*, Intersections. Yearbook for early modern studies, 2 (Leiden & Boston, 2002), 33–46.

35. See for example Lessius: *De iustitia et iure*, II.47.5.30: “(Veritas) versatur circa signa quibus aliquid alteri intendimus significare. Signa enim non sunt data homini propter se, sed propter alium, cui aliter mentem suam aperire nequit.”

36. Thomas Aquinas: *Summa theologiae*, II,II, 109, 2 ob. 4 and ad 4. For a more detailed analysis of the traditional discourse on lying and deceit, see J. A. Dorzinsky: *Catho-*

*lic teaching about the morality of falsehood*, The Catholic University of America studies in sacred theology, second series, 16 (Washington D. C., 1948).

37. Grotius: *De iure belli ac pacis*, III.1.11.1, B. J. A. De Kanter-Van Hettinga Tromp (ed.) (Aalen, 1939 [= Lugduni Batavorum, 1939]), 626–627. For antecedents in the Catholic late scholastic tradition, see Albert R. Jonsen & Stephen Toulmin, *The abuse of casuistry. A history of moral reasoning* (Berkeley, Los Angeles & London, 1988), 211.

38. *De iure belli ac pacis*, III.1.12, B. J. A. De Kanter-Van Hettinga Tromp (ed.), pp. 627–628.

39. “Lingua mentiens est, quae de industria ejusmodi profert verba, quae rem alteri indicandam, non declarant, cui tamen jus competit eam cognoscendi.”

40. Wolff: *Ius naturae*, Marcellus Thomanus (ed.) in Christian Wolff: *Gesammelte Werke*, II. Abteilung (Lateinische Werke), Band 19 (Hildesheim, 1968): “Mendacium falsiloquium illicitum est, quod repugnat officio cuidam erga alios, vel obligationi contractae, qua alteri in singulari tenemur, seu quod est contra jus perfectum vel imperfectum alterius. Sed istiusmodi falsiloquium, quod pugnat cum obligatione, qua alteri ad animi nostri sensa significanda tenemur, consequenter cum officio aliquo erga alios, vel obligatione quadam contracta, qua ipsi in singulari tenemur, quodque adeo est contra jus vel perfectum, vel imperfectum alterius, mendacium est.”

41. “Mendacitas vitium est, quo moraliter falsum loquitur, qui ad moraliter verum dicendum obligatus. Enimvero veracitas virtus est, qua quis moraliter verum loquitur, quando alteri animi sui sensa indicare tenetur.”

42. Wolff: *Ius naturae*, pars III, cap. II, par. 219, pp. 149–150. Cf. Pufendorf: *De officio hominis et civis* (Cantabrigiae, 1682; facsimile reprint in *The classics of international law*, New York, 1927), lib. 1, cap. 10, par. 9. It should be added that Wolff dismissed Grotius’s idea, taken over by Pufendorf, of a *tacit* agreement between speaker and listener; cf. par. 182, p. 122.

43. Wolff: *Philosophia moralis*, pars V, cap. VII, par. 546, pp. 738–739.

44. *Dissertatio* II, par. 61, p. 17: “Hinc patet, linguam mentientem non aestimandam esse ex damno, quod alteri infertur, sed ex suppressione veritatis, quam ut cognoscat

alter, jus ei competens postulat; ita ut id etiam pro mendacio sit habendum, si quis citra damnum alterius, veritatem reticet, quam sciendi jus habet. **Non autem mox mendacium** est, si quis falso sermone damnum ei infert, qui jure veritatem intelligendi non gaudet.”

45. *Ius naturae*, pars III, cap. II, par. 184, p. 124: “Qui tacere potest, ei moraliter falsum loqui non licet.” Cf. *Philosophia moralis*, pars V, cap. VII, par. 540, p. 728: “Qui loquitur, nulla urgente necessitate, ut alteri animi sui sensa declaret, tacere potest, si moraliter verum loqui nolit.”

46. See esp. Dorzinsky: *Catholic Teaching about the Morality of Falsehood*, p. 20.

47. *Dissertatio* II, par. 42, p. 17: “Hinc etiam quivis intelligit mendacium, perfidiam, reservationesque mentales etc. **Lege Naturali prohiberi**” (with reference to Pufendorf: *De officio hominis et civis*, lib. 1, cap. 10, par. 10). Cf. Wolff: *Ius naturae*, pars III, cap. II, par. 231–240, pp. 158–165. According to the doctrine of mental reservation or restriction, a statement that was strictly speaking a lie ceased to be a lie as soon as the mental reservation made by the speaker was taken into consideration. In other words, the inner qualification was believed to preserve an apparently untrue spoken expression from being a lie. Cf. Toon Van Houdt: “Word histories, and beyond: towards a conceptualization of fraud and deceit in early modern times” in Toon Van Houdt et al. (eds.): *On the edge of truth and honesty. Principles and strategies of fraud and deceit in the early modern period*, Intersections. Yearbook for early modern studies, 2 (Leiden & Boston, 2002), 1–32, especially 11 (with further literature).

48. In fact, Roos/Ihre explicitly refer to the first part but, interestingly, never in connection to a particular vicious tongue.

49. “Assentari dicitur, qui quae loquitur vel facit alter, comprobatur laudibusque extollit, ut placeat, parum sollicitus num laudem istam mereantur, et an non potius reprehendenda sint: hinc intelligitur quid sit assentatio: jam qui alteri blanditur, actiones suas externas totus ad id unice componit, ut placeant alteri, nulla prorsus ratione habita moralitatis earundem, (per def.) igitur assentatio blanditiae cujusdam species est. Hic tantum moneo, assentationem cum blanditia, quod vulgo fieri solet, non esse confundendam; latius multo haec illa patet, ut ex col-

latione definitionum facile colligitur: nam si quis verbis blanditur alteri, non semper dicta et facta ejus laudibus extollit.”

50. “Assentari dicitur, qui quae loquitur vel facit alter laudibus extollit, ut placeat, parum sollicitus, num laudem istam mereantur, et an non potius reprehendenda sint. Unde patet quale vitium sit Assentatio. Quoniam qui alteri blanditur, actiones suas externas totus ad id unice componit, ut placeant alteri (par. 961); assentatio blanditiae cujusdam species est. Vulgo assentatio cum blanditia [sic] in unum confunditur; haec tamen illa multo latius patet (par. 961 et praef.). Immo si verbis blandimur alteri, non semper dicta et facta ejus laudibus extollimus.”

51. “Confundi etiam solet assentatio haud raro cum adulatione, quatenus etiam adulator laudibus immeritis alterum ornat (par. 892), quousque laudes actum quoque honorandi ingrediuntur. Enimvero assentator, quemadmodum qui blanditur alteri, id potissimum sibi propositum habet, ne alterum offendant, cum ex adverso adulator alterius gratiam ac favorem aucupetur utilitatis propriae gratia.”

52. For a more detailed analysis of the mode of discourse and the rhetorical strategies applied by Drexel, see my “Hieremias Drexel’s emblem book *Orbis Phaëthon*”, especially 339–344.

53. In fact, the passage is not to be found in Diodorus’s *Library of History*.

54. See Daniel 13.

55. Cf. Desiderius Erasmus: *Ad. 2256* (= III.3.56) in *Adagiorum chiliarum tertia*, Felix Heinemann & Emanuel Kienzle (eds.), *Opera omnia Desiderii Roterodami*, II.5 (Amsterdam & Oxford, 1981), 216–217. On the all-pervasive presence of Erasmian adages and proverbs in Drexel’s *Orbis Phaëthon*, see Latham: “Text and image”, 101–103 and Van Houdt: “Hieremias Drexel’s emblem book”, 332–334.

56. See Matthew 7:9.

57. Drexel: *Orbis Phaëthon*, cap. V, par. 1, p. 97: “(...) Narrat Diodorus Siculus in Australi quadam insula gentem degere, quae ab ima fauce linguam naturaliter divisam, tamque volubilem habeat, ut non tantum voces humanas omnes, sed omnigenarum avium cantus imitari, et unus quidem ex illa gente duobus hominibus commode respondere possit [note a. Diodor. l. 3. Sub finem]. Pulchrum, arbitror, figmentum, huc tamen aptum. Artificium istud hominis bilinguis est;

inter corvos crocitat, inter acanthides fringulit, inter lusciniās cantat, inter columbulos pipit: bilinguis uno eodemque tempore duobus, imo pluribus respondet, his nigrum, illis album, cum ista parte de cepis, cum illa de allijs loquitur. In homine bilingui cor et lingua minime conveniunt, prout improbi senes illi loquebantur, qui Susannae pudicitiam sollicitarunt, quorum ille dixerat sub schino, iste sub prino. hoc unus idemque homo potest, si sit bilinguis. Nam, ut vetus verbum est, Aliud stans, aliud sedens; mel illi in ore est, sub cingulo novacula; altera fert lapidem, altera panem ostentat; servitium offert et meditatur exitium. (...)

58. Roos/Ihre, *Dissertatio*, pars I, par. 26, pp. 19–20: “... Narrat Diodorus Siculus Lib. 3. sub finem: in australi quadam insula gentem degere, quae ab ima fauce, linguam naturaliter divisam tamque volubilem habeat, ut non tantum voces humanas omnes, sed omnigenarum avium cantus imitari, et unus quidem ex illa gente duobus hominibus commode simul respondere possit. Pulcrum arbitror figmentum, utpote quod depingit artificium istud hominis bilinguis; inter corvos ille crocitat, inter achantides fringulit, inter lusciniās cantat, inter columbas pipit: bilinguis uno eodemque tempore duobus, immo pluribus respondet, his nigrum, illis album, cum ista parte de cepis, cum illa de alliis loquitur. Nam ut vetus proverbium habet: aliud stans, aliud sedens loquitur, eodemque ore et calidum et frigidum flare solet. *Ex hoc etiam fonte originem suam saepissime ducit vitium maligne consulentis Linguae; quae non turguria tantum et casas; sed curias, palatia regumque turres inquinat: sic proh dolor! dan-*

*tur, qui propriae utilitatis caussa, saepe mala consilia suppeditant.*”

59. Cap. 8, p. 153: “Inter linguas vitiosas summae auctoritatis est, Maligne Consulens, haec enim non turguria tantum et casas, sed curias, palatia, regumque turres inquinat. Maximorum malorum mater est lingua haec, nisi non solum perite, sed et sancte optimaque fide gubernetur.”

60. On the commonplace tradition, see the standard work by Ann Moss: *Printed commonplace-books and the structuring of Renaissance thought* (Oxford, 1966). For Drexel’s specific views on, and guidelines for, compiling a commonplace book see also Florian Neumann: “Jeremias Drexel’s *Aurifodina* und die *Ars excerptandi* bei den Jesuiten” in Helmut Zedelmaier & Martin Mulsow (eds.): *Die Praktiken der Gelehrsamkeit in der Frühen Neuzeit*, Frühe Neuzeit, 64 (Tübingen, 2001), 1–16.

61. Cf. Van Houdt: “Hieremias Drexel’s emblem book”, 328–329 and 343–344.

62. Drexel: *Orbis Phaëthon*, “Ad lectorem”: “Adversae parti sanctos et pudicos mores propono; doctrinam illius refellere instituti mei non est. (...) Non nescio plurimos adversae partis innocenter errare.”

63. I owe this remark to one of the anonymous referees.

64. A more encompassing analysis of Ihre’s (philosophical) dissertations is needed to corroborate the connexion with philosophical eclecticism suggested here. On this subject, see for example Hochstrasser: *Natural law theories*, 13–14.

65. Cf. Frängsmyr: *Svensk idéhistoria*, 320.